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Opposites and Identities: Maurice Scève’s Délie  
and Charles de Bovelles’s Ars Oppositorum 
 
 
i) Opposition in Early Sixteenth-Century Poetry and Philosophy 
 
Opposition is central to much early-sixteenth century writing in the domains 
of both poetry and philosophy. Love lyricists use antitheses to depict the 
lover‟s experience: opposites such as heat and cold, sickness and health, and 
fire and ice are extremely commonplace. Two very different conceptions of 
„opposites‟ were available to philosophical prose: those of the Aristotelian 
square of „opposites‟, and those which, in the thought of Nicholas of Cusa, 
coincide in the vision of the divine. In this essay, I will examine examples of 
both love poetry and prose philosophy: Maurice Scève‟s Délie (1544) and 
Charles de Bovelles‟s Ars Oppositorum (1511)1 respectively. I intend to 
show that both texts, in their contrasting discursive domains, explore 
opposition and its relationship to difference, identity, and similarity; both 
                                                 
1
 The Ars was published together with a series of other works; it reworks and develops material from 
Bovelles‟s earlier In Artem Oppositorum Introductio (1501). 
 2 
also challenge conceptions of difference and identity, expressing a particular 
interest in antithetical or binary pairs.  
Stephen Murphy‟s fascinating article, „Bovelles. Scève. Bruno. 
Antiperistasis‟, pointed to convergences between Bovelles and Petrarchist 
poetry in general as well as Scève‟s Délie in particular.2 Murphy notes that 
in both Bovelles‟s theory and Petrarchist poetry opposites serve to intensify 
each other; in the case of poetry, the lover‟s mal means that his bien 
increases. Murphy further suggests that the Délie is particularly interesting 
because of its oft-noted evocation of simultaneous opposites (rather than 
cyclical ones), such as „heureux souffrir‟ (pp. 43-6). Murphy then pursues 
other related concerns, analysing conceptions of opposition in Bruno‟s 
commentary on love poems in De gli eroici furori, and their movement 
towards mystical theology; however, opposites in the Délie – and their 
relationship to Bovelles‟s writing – are also very worthy of further study. 
Scève and Bovelles share an interest not only in the mutual intensification of 
opposites but also in the relationship between antithetical modes of 
difference and other kinds, as well as in the dynamic interactions between 
different pairs of opposites.  
                                                 
2 Allegorica 14 (1993), pp. 39-52. See also Jacqueline Risset, L’Anagramme du désir: Sur la Délie de 
Maurice Scève (Paris, Fourbis, 1995), pp. 91-100; Doranne Fenoaltea, “Si haulte Architecture”: The 
Design of Scève’s Délie (Kentucky: French Forum, 1982), pp. 84-92.  
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ii) The Vocabulary of ‘Opposition’ in the Ars Oppositorum and the Délie 
 
Bovelles‟s Ars Oppositorum both employs  and transforms  the Aristotelian 
concept of oppositio („opposition‟). The Aristotelian notion of a square of 
opposites is central to the Ars but Bovelles uses it very differently from more 
traditional Aristotelian writers.
3
 Bovelles‟s square, like the Aristotelian one, 
is intended to produce knowledge. However, it differs from the traditional 
square concerning the types of „opposition‟ involved in creating knowledge, 
as well as the sort of knowledge achieved.  
The Aristotelian square of opposites was used to analyse the 
relationships of „opposition‟ between propositions (statements), in order to 
determine how the possible truth or falsity of one or more propositions 
limited the possible truth or falsity of others. „Opposition‟ did not carry its 
                                                 
3
 For discussions of Bovelles‟s Ars, see Maurice de Gandillac, „L‟Art bovilien des opposés‟, in Charles de 
Bovelles en son cinquième centenaire 1479-1979: Actes du colloque international tenu à Noyon les 14-15-
16 septembre 1979, ed. by Jean-Claude Margolin (Paris: Guy Trédaniel, Éditions de la Maisnie, 1982), pp. 
157-70; Joseph M. Victor, Charles de Bovelles 1479-1553: An Intellectual Biography (Geneva: Droz, 
1978), pp. 73-87; and Jean-Claude Margolin, „Sur L’Art des opposés de Bovelles‟, in Logique et Littérature 
à la Renaissance: Actes du Colloque de la Baume-les-Aix, Université de Provence, 16-18 septembre 1991, 
eds Marie-Luce Demonay-Launay and André Tournon (Paris: Champion, 1994), pp. 5-16. 
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modern everyday meaning of antithetical or absolute difference but rather 
referred to four contrasting kinds of differing, of which only the „contrary‟ 
implies absolute difference (of the type existing between the propositions 
„all A is B‟ and „no A is B‟). Depending upon which of the particular 
„oppositions‟ (or types of differing) held between propositions, particular 
inferences could be made: thus the square provided a logical basis for 
validating certain forms of argument regardless of whether the subject-
matter concerned, for example, the mortality of men or the ingratitude of 
republics. 
By contrast with traditional Aristotelian logicians, Bovelles inserts 
into his square of opposites not propositions (such as “all men are mortal”) 
but single terms such as “light”, “darkness”, “God”, “nothing”, “truth”, 
“falsity”, “unity” and “number”. Furthermore, Bovelles states in the opening 
paragraph of his first chapter that for him oppositio (opposition) refers not 
simply to the logicians‟ four types of difference but rather to any sort of 
relationship between things: „we, by contrast [with the „dialecticians‟], wish 
in this work to give a broader meaning to the term of opposition … for 
although most things in existence seem not to have received from nature any 
contrariety or dispute, they are nevertheless called opposites with respect to 
 5 
one another for the sole reason of their mutual relation‟.4 Bovelles expresses 
this mutual relation in spatial terms which are characteristic of much of his 
discussion throughout the Ars.
5
 However, while being broader than logical 
categories of difference, it is clearly a relation of some kind of difference (or 
identity): Bovelles proceeds to discuss the sources of „every difference and 
unity of things‟.6 As in Aristotelian logic, consideration of oppositions can 
reveal knowledge about many disciplines, but for Bovelles (as he explains in 
his dedicatory address to François de Melun) this is because knowledge 
about one discipline can be gleaned from another, thanks to the 
                                                 
4
 „Nos vero hoc in proposito latius oppositionis nomen extendi volumus … Nam tametsi pleraque entium 
nullam natura aut contrarietatem aut pugnantiam sortita esse videantur, opposita tamen invicem sola mutue 
relationis causa vocantur‟: ed. by Pierre Magnard, (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1984), p. 36. I 
refer throughout to Magnard‟s edition; translations into English are my own, although I have consulted 
Magnard‟s French translation. 
5
 „we, by contrast, wish in this work to give a broader meaning to the term of opposition, to all those things, 
I say, which in any way you like are placed facing each other either by nature or by the understanding 
(intellectus), or which in whatever way you please are returned / referred each to the other, or which 
[taken] from their own area are placed facing each other, are turned back towards each other and as if by 
the distance of some diameter look at each other‟: „Nos vero hoc in proposito latius oppositionis nomen 
extendi volumus, ad ea inquam cuncta, que quomodovis contra sese aut natura aut intellectu statuuntur, 
queve quomodolibet ad alterutrum referuntur, queve regione sui et adversum se collocantur, in seinvicem 
convertuntur et velut quodam diametri interstitio in alterutrum spectant‟ (p. 36, my italics) 
6
 „omnis rerum differitas unitasque‟ (p. 38). 
 6 
„coincidence‟ and „proportion‟ of all opposites.7  The art of opposites thus 
gives rise to a creative movement of language, „a productive development of 
discourse‟;8 as a result, it is even possible to use the human disciplines to 
„voice‟ in some sense divine mysteries.9  
Therefore Bovelles‟s concept of „opposition‟ is even broader than the 
Aristotelian one, which itself does not necessarily imply antithetical 
difference. For Bovelles, oppositio can mean simply the relation of two 
things to one another (or the placing of two things in relation to one 
another); opposita denotes the two things which are considered in relation to 
one another. However, many of the pairs of terms which Bovelles considers 
are in fact antithetical ones, binary pairs such as light and darkness. 
Furthermore, oppositio is used to denote the bringing together of antithetical 
terms such as Deus (God) and nichil (nothing). In this context oppositio is 
                                                 
7
 p. 32. On gaining knowledge about different disciplines from the square, see also chapter 17.  
8
 „fecunda quedam orationis propagatio‟ (p. 32). Insofar as he implies the conjunction of knowledge and 
discourse, Bovelles‟s attitude to Aristotelian logic can be compared to that of logicians like Petrus Ramus. 
Bovelles repeats the idea of the productivity of his square: „Et per hec opposite equidistantiam et angulum 
sive intersectionem, latissime de cunctis oppositis philosophari‟ („And through these opposites, parallelism 
and the angle or intersection, one can philosophise extensively on all opposites‟, p. 66, my italics). 
9
 pp. 32-4. Later in Bovelles‟s career, he moved further towards speculative theology, and what Lefèvre 
d‟Etaples called „intellectual‟ philosophy (that is, philosophy based in intuition rather than reason): see 
Victor, pp. 54-5.  
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aligned with lis (conflict), bellum (war), and discordia (discord; p. 56). 
Although Bovelles has said that „opposites‟ can be any terms in relation with 
one another, oppositio also comes to signify antithetical and conflictual 
difference. Oppositio equivocates between denoting, on the one hand, any 
relationship between two terms, and, on the other hand, a relationship of 
conflictual binary difference, of „discord‟ and „war‟. The term opposita 
carries similarly contrasting meanings. Thus Bovelles‟s vocabulary confuses 
antithetical difference with other kinds of difference and of similarity. Kinds 
of difference cannot be clearly categorised as they are in Aristotelian logic, 
and antithetical difference cannot be clearly distinguished from other kinds. 
Bovelles not only broadens the concept of oppositio but also troubles its 
conceptual boundaries. Indeed Bovelles sometimes discusses the very terms 
„same‟ (idem) and „opposite‟ (oppositum) – alongside his discussion of other 
pairs such as „light‟ and „darkness‟ – and this gives rise to complex 
statements about opposition such as „if the same is in the opposite, the 
opposite will be in the same‟.10  
By contrast with the Ars Oppositorum, Scève‟s Délie belongs to a 
genre in which the primary object of description is supposed to be a lady 
                                                 
10
 „Et ita in cunctis reperies, si idem eodem fuerit, fore simul oppositum in opposite, et si idem in opposite, 
oppositum fore in eodem‟ (p. 54).  
 8 
rather than opposition; unsurprisingly, then, Scève uses the abstract language 
of difference much less frequently than Bovelles does. However, Scève does 
occasionally use terms associated with opposition, and, like Bovelles, he 
does so in a manner which is far from straightforward. In D124, Apollo is 
evoked as the jealous sun who hides his light in response to the lady‟s 
superior light. The lady is referred to as Apollo‟s contraire, a term which 
implies absolute difference both generally and also in Aristotelian logic.
11
 
Yet, while the lady may be superior to the sun, they are also similar since 
both supposedly emit a bright light. In other words, Scève uses the 
vocabulary of antithetical difference (contraire) for a relation which 
apparently involves a more nuanced type of difference and also similarity. 
Like Bovelles, Scève seems to question the meaning of antithetical 
difference and its relationship to other sorts of difference, as if asking 
whether absolute difference and similarity can somehow co-exist. Both 
Scève and Bovelles use the vocabulary of opposition in a way which implies 
that its meaning is not self-evident; both, to varying extents, use vocabulary 
                                                 
11
 It can also have a spatial meaning: Algirdan Julien Greimas and Teresa Mary Keane give a definition of 
it as „de direction opposée‟:, Dictionnaire du moyen français: la Renaissance (Paris: Larousse, 1992). This, 
together with Scève‟s cosmic imagery, suggests that Scève – like Bovelles – thinks of opposition in 
potentially spatial terms; however, developing this line of thought is beyond the scope of this essay.  
 9 
from logic and yet go beyond or trouble the meanings which such 
vocabulary carries in logic. 
 
 
iii) Relations of Opposition and Identity in the Délie: The Lady and the 
Sun 
 
While Scève does not often use the abstract vocabulary of opposition, I will 
argue that – by placing particular terms into relations which seem to 
fluctuate between difference, identity, and similarity – he does question the 
categorisation of types of difference or opposition, and explore the ways in 
which identity and difference might co-exist. I will focus in particular upon 
the relations of „opposition‟ between the lady and the sun, which are at issue 
not only in D124 but in many other dizains. Studies of the cosmos in the 
Délie have tended to focus upon the relationship between the ie and the 
cosmos (rather than the lady and the cosmos).
12
 However, the relationship 
                                                 
12
 In his Harmonie divine et subjectivité poétique chez Maurice Scève (Geneva: Droz, 2001), James 
Helgeson focuses upon the relationship between the cosmos and the ie, as his title suggests. The lady is part 
of the subject‟s relationship with the world, and the subject attempts to force her into the mould of cosmic 
harmony. Hans Staub focused upon the cognitive movement into the world of the ie, and considered the 
 10 
between the lady and the sun is particularly interesting for my purposes here 
because it involves complex relations of difference, similarity, and identity. 
Scève is working through specific questions thrown up by the 
discourse of love lyric, such as the nature of the similarity between the lady 
and the celestial, as well as the related question of the difference between the 
ie and the lady who seems as distant and different from him as the sun is 
from the earth. However, in love lyric, desire and difference seem to be a 
priori bound up with one another; indeed other love lyricists also use the 
word contraire to refer to the lady who refuses the poet‟s desire.13 Moreover, 
for Scève in particular, love seems to be bound up with a difference which 
defies categorisation in terms of Aristotelian logic.  
Critics of the Délie – and of love lyric more generally – often refer to 
the relationship between the human and the cosmic as if its nature were self-
evident, as if it were predetermined by a fixed sixteenth-century conception 
of the „microcosm‟: cosmic images are explained with reference to a 
relationship between the human and the cosmic which, apparently, was 
                                                                                                                                                 
lady to be united with the ie in this movement: Le Curieux Désir: Scève et Peletier du Mans, poètes de la 
connaissance (Geneva: Droz, 1967), pp. 35-84.  
13
 Edmond Huguet, Dictionnaire de la langue française du seizième siècle (Paris, 1925-), 7 vols, p. 487. 
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universally interpreted to be one of similarity.
14
 This is suggested more 
explicitly by Hans Staub‟s use of a quotation from Cusa to frame his reading 
of the Délie: the quotation states that the human behaves like the cosmic but 
„in a human way‟, humaniter.15 I would not dispute the idea – expressed 
most explicitly by Jean Rousset – that cosmic images in sixteenth-century 
poetry are ontologically grounded in the relationship between the human and 
the cosmic.
16
 However, it does not follow that this relationship was 
conceived in only one fixed and stable way, as a relationship of similarity. I 
                                                 
14
 For example, Jerry C. Nash considers Scève‟s solar and lunar images to represent a triumph of clarity 
over obscurity, thus implying that cosmic light is simply a symbol of human cognition, thanks to the 
similarity between the two; cf. my discussion of the relationship between light and cognition in „The 
Cosmic, the Human, and the Divine: The Role of Poetic Images in Guillaume de Saluste Du Bartas‟s 
Sepmaine and Maurice Scève‟s Délie‟ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Cambridge, 2005), Part 
II; my book under preparation, Cosmos and Image in the French Renaissance; and in a second planned 
article on the Délie and the Ars Oppositorum, „Difference, Cognition, and Causality: Maurice Scève‟s Délie 
and Charles de Bovelles‟s Ars Oppositorum. Critics often refer to the „universe‟ of the Délie to mean the 
subjective „world‟ of the lover, thus suggesting that the cosmos is not a concern but simply a source of 
images. See also Fenoaltea, for whom the role of the cosmos is to illustrate and clarify the lover‟s 
experience: “Si haulte architecture”, pp. 35-52. 
15
 Curieux Désir, pp. 9, 35-84. 
16
 L’Intérieur et l’extérieur: essai sur la poésie et sur le théâtre au XVIe siècle (Paris: Librairie José Corti, 
1976) pp. 57-71. 
 12 
will suggest rather that the Délie interrogates the roles in this relationship of 
difference, similarity, and identity.
17
  
In the Délie, as in much other love lyric of the same period, the 
beloved lady is often related to cosmic light-sources and in particular to the 
sun.
18
 The poet shifts between, on the one hand, evoking Délie and the sun 
as separate beings and discussing their differences, and, on the other hand, 
identifying and conflating the lady and the sun. Sometimes the relationship 
between the lady and the cosmic light-source is one of similarity or analogy. 
For example, in D24 the relationship of the ie with the lady resembles the 
relationship which human beings in general have with cosmic light: the ie is 
dazzled by the lady‟s light just as the human eye is dazzled by cosmic light.  
 
Quand l‟œil aux champs est d‟esclairs esblouy, 
                                                 
17
 My study Cosmos and Image is also concerned with difference and similarity in the relationship between 
the human and the cosmic (and the divine); however, whereas the focus in this essay will be on concepts of 
difference or opposition, the focus in my book will be on the human, the cosmic, and the divine. Thus the 
two projects respond to very different concerns within the same nexus of problems. See also my „Situating 
the Masculine: Gender, Identity and the Cosmos in Maurice Scève‟s Délie, Marsilio Ficino‟s De Amore and 
Leone Ebreo‟s Dialoghi‟ in Masculinities in Sixteenth-Century France: The Eighth Cambridge French 
Renaissance Colloquium (Cambridge: Cambridge French Colloquia, forthcoming). 
18
 On light imagery in the Délie, see also Lance K. Donaldson-Evans, Love’s Fatal Glance: A Study of Eye 
Imagery in the Poets of the Ecole Lyonnaise (University, Miss.: Romance Monographs, Inc, 1980), pp. 99-
144; Banks, „The Cosmic‟, Part II. 
 13 
Luy semble nuict quelque part, qu‟il regarde : 
Puis peu à peu de clarté resjouy, 
Des soubdains feuz du Ciel se contregarde. 
   Mais moy conduict dessoubs la sauvegarde 
De ceste tienne, et unique lumiere, 
Qui m‟offusca ma lyesse premiere 
Par tes doulx rays aiguement suyviz, 
Ne me pers plus en veue coustumiere. 
   Car seulement pour t‟adorer ie vis.19 
 
The first four lines describe the effects of cosmic light, then the final six 
lines evoke those of the lady‟s „light‟. There is no confusion between the 
cosmic light and the lady, especially since the ie distinguishes between their 
effects using „mais‟: the light and the lady are said to be similar but they are 
not identified with one another; each has its own separate place in the cosmic 
realm and the human realm respectively.  
In the same way, in D386, the sun‟s rays resemble Délie‟s hair, and its 
dazzling midday strength resembles her dazzling eyes, but Délie and the sun 
are not represented as being identical: 
 
Quand Apollo après l‟Aulbe vermeille 
Poulse le bout de ses rayons dorez, 
Semble à mon œil, qui lors point ne sommeille, 
                                                 
19
 Throughout this essay I cite Gérard Defaux‟s edition of the Délie (Geneva: Droz, 2004). 
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Veoir les cheveulx, de ce Monde adorez, 
Qui par leurs noudz de mes mortz decorez 
M‟ont à ce joug jusqu‟à ma fin conduyct. 
   Et quand après à plaine face il luyt, 
Il m‟est advis, que ie voy clerement 
Les yeulx, desquelz la clarté tant me nuyt,  
Qu‟elle esblouyt ma veue entierement.  
 
In these dizains, Délie‟s resemblance to the sun is congruent with a 
conception of the human-cosmos relation as one of analogy or similarity: the 
lady is apparently a human equivalent of the sun, performing a similar role 
for the poetic subject as the sun performs in the cosmos. These dizains fit 
with the notion that the human is similar to the cosmic, and with Staub‟s 
Cusan reading in which the human resembles the universe but „in a human 
way‟.  
However, the Délie does not always reiterate this particular 
conception of the relationship between the human realm and the cosmos. In 
other dizains the lady and the sun are conflated. For example, D92 opens in 
a similar manner to D386 in that the sun makes it seem to the ie as if he sees 
the lady who startles and dazzles him; as in D386, the sun is similar to Délie 
yet separate from her. However, when, in the final two lines of the dizain, 
 15 
the poet evokes „tel Soleil‟, these words could denote the solar body itself or 
could have come to refer to the lady:  
 
Sur nostre chef gettant Phebus ses rayz, 
Faisoit bouillir de son cler jour la None : 
Advis me fut de veoir en son taint frais 
Celle, de qui la rencontre m‟estonne, 
De qui la voix si fort en l‟ame tonne : 
Que ne puis d‟elle un seul doulx mot ouir : 
Et de qui l‟oeil vient ma veue esblouir, 
Tant qu‟aultre n‟est, fors elle, à mes yeux belle.  
   Me pourra donc tel Soleil resjouir, 
Quand tout Mydi m‟est nuict, voire eternelle ? 
 
In the opening lines, the ie tells us that when the sun shines in the late 
afternoon („la None‟), he imagines that he sees the lady; then, in the final 
two lines, he wonders whether „such a sun‟ („tel Soleil‟) can bring him joy, 
when every midday is to him eternal night. The argument of these final two 
lines might be construed as follows: the poet will be unable to gain joy from 
the sun (the cosmic body) because of the love for his lady which he has 
evoked in lines 3-8. In this reading, „tel Soleil‟ would refer to the solar 
cosmic body, as one would usually expect. However, the potential absence 
of joy from „tel Soleil‟ results from the fact that „tout Mydi m‟est nuict, 
voire eternelle‟ (l. 10): therefore, since literal cosmic midday could not in 
 16 
any real sense be either night or eternal, „tel Soleil‟ does not seem to refer 
literally to the cosmic solar body. In addition, the idea of midday being night 
recalls the notion of a light so dazzling that it casts the ie into darkness, and 
such a light figures in the Délie as an image of the lady, for example in D386 
(quoted on page 13) and D51 (quoted on page 17); indeed in D92 itself the 
lady has been evoked in her dazzling role (l. 7), whereas the actual cosmic 
sun was in „la None‟, the fourth quarter of the day, rather than at midday. So, 
„tel Soleil‟ seems to refer to the lady whose gaze might dazzle the poet into 
darkness, or „turn “midday” into “night”‟. Moreover, in D92 it is only the ie 
who is said to experience midday as eternal night („tout Mydi m‟est nuict‟): 
this suggests that it is his „sun‟ – the lady – who is here referred to as a 
„Soleil‟. On the other hand, in this particular dizain, the lady has not 
previously been referred to as a sun, and her dazzling gaze has not been 
foregrounded but rather features as only one of a list of her attributes: thus 
the reader does not necessarily have in mind an image of her as a sun, 
whereas the poet has definitely created an image of the cosmic sun casting 
its rays. So, by contrast with references to the sun in dizains 24 and 386, the 
expression „tel Soleil‟ does not refer unambiguously to either the sun or the 
lady. 
 17 
Thus, in D92, „tel Soleil‟ has attributes of the lady (casting the ie into 
darkness), so that „Soleil‟ equivocates between referring to the solar cosmic 
body or to the supposedly human lady. Although D92 begins by comparing 
the lady and the sun to one another, by the end of the dizain there seems to 
be only one „sun‟. There is not an equivalent „universe‟ in the human realm 
which resembles the cosmic „universe‟: this is not an analogic relation 
between cosmos and human in which the sun and the lady would be similar 
yet nonetheless clearly maintain their difference. Instead, the macrocosm and 
the microcosm are collapsed onto the same signifiers. The sun and the lady 
of whom the sun reminds the ie seem to become one. In the same way, D51 
begins by explicitly comparing the sun and the lady (or, at least, „si grand 
beaulté‟), but then proceeds to a discussion which is apparently of the lady, 
yet which uses so much solar vocabulary that the sun and the lady seem to 
have merged into one, or to occupy the same place:  
   
Si grand beaulté, mais bien si grand merveille,  
Qui à Phebus offusque sa clarté, 
Soit que ie sois present, ou escarté, 
De sorte l‟ame en sa lueur m‟esveille, 
Qu‟il m‟est advis en dormant, que ie veille, 
Et qu‟en son jour un espoir ie prevoy, 
Qui de bien brief, sans deslay, ou envoy, 
M‟esclercira mes pensées funebres.  
 18 
   Mais quand sa face en son Mydy ie voy, 
A tous clarté, et à moy rend tenebres.  
 
Here the lady is not cosmic „in a human way‟ („humaniter‟) but literally is 
the cosmic.  
 Of course it is common poetic practice for the second pole of a 
comparison to be implicit and unexplained so that, for example, a poet says 
„sun‟ and means „lady‟. However, Scève moves between explicit comparison 
of the lady and the sun – implying their similarity yet separate existences – 
and implicit „comparison‟, or conflation of the lady and the sun onto the 
same signifiers. In other words, it is not simply that Scève uses solar 
vocabulary for his lady: rather he evokes and compares the sun and the lady, 
then confuses them so that the solar vocabulary might refer to either or both. 
He compares them, referring to their differences and similarities, but then 
conflates them, making it difficult to distinguish between them. Thus, I 
would suggest that, rather than being ontologically grounded in the notion of 
a relationship between the human and the cosmos based in similarity, 
Scève‟s cosmic images explore the nature of that relationship by 
reconstruing it as one of similarity and difference, then as one of identity. 
This reconfigures the same relationship as one of difference and one of 
 19 
identity, and undermines any sense that one should be able to define 
relationships in terms of difference or of identity exclusively.   
 Furthermore, other relationships of difference and similarity are also 
implicated in the shifting relations between the lady and the sun. If we 
accept that the solar signifiers in D9 refer to the sun as well as to the lady, 
then the midday sun is conflated with a different – even opposite (in the 
sense of antithetical) – point on the cosmic cycle: night. Furthermore, these 
opposites are in turn conflated with the eternal, which one can think of as 
„containing‟ all temporal points. The „sun‟ merges with its opposite as a 
result of the equivocation of „soleil‟ between referring to the sun and 
referring to the lady. In other words, the lady‟s shifting relationship of 
similarity and sameness to the sun in a sense changes the sun: that is, as a 
result of being in a shifting relation of difference with the lady, the sun 
becomes different, or opposed to itself.  
 A similar process is arguably at work in D124, the dizain in which the 
lady is referred to as Apollo‟s „contraire‟:  
 
Si Apollo restrainct ses raiz dorez, 
Se marrissant tout honteux soubz la nue, 
C‟est par les tiens de ce Monde adorez, 
Desquelz l‟or pur sa clarté diminue. 
   Parquoy soubdain, qu‟icy tu es venue, 
 20 
Estant sur toy, son contraire, envieux, 
A congelé ce Brouas pluvieux, 
Pour contrelustre à ta divine face. 
Mais ton tainct frais vainct la neige des cieulx, 
Comme le jour la clere nuict efface. 
 
The lady and the sun, Apollo, are similar in their brightness, although the 
lady‟s brightness is superior. Furthermore, the lady is, in line 10, compared 
to the sun, or at least to „le jour‟. However, as we have seen, despite her 
similarity to Apollo, the lady is described as Apollo‟s „opposite‟, his 
„contraire‟ (l. 6). Moreover, it is suggested that the lady‟s brightness 
diminishes that of Apollo. Finally, when the lady is aligned with „le jour‟, 
the sun (Apollo) is implicitly aligned with the „neige des cieulx‟ and even „la 
clere nuict‟. Despite being similar to the lady, Apollo does seem to become 
something like her „contraire‟ and, moreover, is also something like his own 
„contraire‟, the night. Once again, a dizain opens by referring to a 
relationship of similarity between the lady and the sun, yet by the end of the 
dizain solar signifiers (in this case jour) have come to refer to the lady, and 
the sun has implicitly become something different from – or even opposite 
to – itself: complex relations of difference are introduced into the sun by the 
same token that they exist in the relationship between the lady and the sun. 
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As in D92, a resemblance between the lady and the sun undermines the 
sun‟s sameness to itself and perhaps also its opposition to night. 
 
 
iv) Relations of Opposition and Identity in the Ars Oppositorum 
 
By occupying the place of the sun, the lady troubles the cosmic hierarchy in 
which the solar should be higher than the human and opposite to the night. 
Bovelles also connects conflictual oppositio with undoing this hierarchy: 
oppositio reverses the hierarchy so that earth is high and fire is low (p. 58). 
Moreover, the interaction between different pairs of terms – which I have 
described in the Délie – is discussed more explicitly by Bovelles. In the 
Délie, then, the relations of difference between one pair of terms (the sun 
and the lady) affect the relationship between another pair (night and day). 
Bovelles‟s theoretical text is also concerned with how pairs of „opposites‟ 
function and interact: in the Ars Oppositorum, the relation between a pair of 
opposites is redefined by their relation to another pair of opposites. Bovelles 
describes how opposites – such as Deus (God) and nichil (nothing) – partake 
not only in a relation of opposition to each other but also in relations of 
sameness with other terms: thus Deus is in a relation of sameness with esse 
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(being), and nichil is in a relation of sameness with non esse (not being). 
Bovelles represents these relationships diagrammatically, as shown in fig. 1. 
Deus and esse are linked by a „line of identity‟, as are nichil and non esse. 
By contrast, „lines of opposition‟ link Deus to non esse, and nichil to esse 
(p. 64). Bovelles explains that these „lines of opposition‟ give rise to four 
more, since the two angles formed by their intersections form four further 
lines of opposition (p. 66). However, the relations of „opposition‟ 
represented by these additional lines „oppose‟ Deus and esse, which are also 
joined by a „line of identity‟, and which one would not expect to be opposed 
(at least if „opposition‟ is conceived, as it is here, as diversity and discord 
rather than simply as a relation): 
 
Similarly all the lines which form an angle, like those which go from God to both being and non-
being, or from nothing to both being and non-being, or from God and nothing to being, or from 
God and nothing to non-being, are called lines of opposition, diversity, and discord.
20
 
 
Thus, the relation of identity or opposition between a pair of terms is altered 
by the placing of that pair in a relation with another pair, so that some terms 
are „joined‟ to one another by both identity and opposition. 
                                                 
20
 „Similiter et quecunque faciunt angulum ut que a deo simul ad esse et non esse, vel que a nichilo ad esse 
et non esse, aut que a deo et nichilo ad esse, aut a deo et nichilo ad non esse producuntur, he oppositionis 
diversitatis et discordie line vocitentur‟ (p. 66). 
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 This is rather like the process I have analysed in the Délie. Indeed one 
might place the pairs „ie‟ and „lady‟, and „sun‟ (or „iour‟) and „night‟ (or 
„darkness‟) into Bovelles‟s diagram in place of Deus and nichil, and esse and 
non esse; after all, Bovelles suggests that his Ars can be used to find 
knowledge about all sorts of pairs of opposites. In fig. 2, I have joined „lady‟ 
and „sun‟ with a „line of identity‟, since these two terms are similar; likewise 
„ie‟ and „night‟ can be joined with a „line of identity‟, since the ie often 
bemoans his state of darkness which results from his encounter with the 
lady-sun. While „identity‟ seems too strong a term for those instances where 
the lady and the sun (or ie and darkness) are simply said to be alike, it is 
appropriate for the instances where they are conflated.  As a result of 
inserting these terms into the square, the lady and the sun become joined 
simultaneously by identity and by opposition, something which also happens 
in the very different context of the Délie. One could also place „sun‟ and 
„night‟ into the diagram so that they were joined by lines of both opposition 
and identity. Therefore opposition functions in similarly paradoxical ways in 
both the theoretical text and the poetic one: both Scève and Bovelles suggest 
that, as part of a dynamic relation between pairs of terms, opposition can co-
exist with identity, and the existence of one relation can create the other.  
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 As well as pointing to the dynamic nature of the relationship between 
different pairs of opposites, Bovelles also – like Scève – breaks down 
antithetical differences between binary pairs like darkness and light: I 
observed earlier that, despite Bovelles‟s inclusive definition of opposites, he 
uses many antithetical pairs, but, furthermore, he is also interested in 
breaking down antithetical differences, in uniting opposites. Bovelles uses 
the square of opposites to generate propositions, showing how it produces: 
„truth is true truth‟, „falseness is true falseness‟, „truth is false falseness‟, and 
„falseness is false truth‟. He then – presumably following his stated principle 
of proceeding from knowledge in one discipline to knowledge in another – 
similarly produces a set of statements concerning light and darkness: „light is 
luminous light‟; „light is dark darkness‟; „darkness is light darkness‟; and, 
„darkness is dark light‟ (pp. 120-2). While one might be able to construct 
some sort of commonsensical meaning from the propositions concerning 
truth and falsity, the statement that „light is dark darkness‟ has no obviously 
comprehensible meaning. Thus, like Scève, Bovelles not only uses the 
vocabulary of antithetical difference for „oppositions‟ which involve 
similarity or even identity, but he also has a strong interest in breaking down 
antithetical differences and in making opposites coincide. His statement that 
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„light is darkness‟ recalls the simultaneity of opposites in the Délie where 
midday is night. 
As we have seen, in the Délie it is the lady who introduces such 
complex differences into the world. In addition, the breaking down of 
opposites may have something to do with her „divinity‟. In D92, the 
conflated opposites of day and night are in turn conflated with the eternal: 
„Me pourra donc tel Soleil resjouir, / Quand tout Mydi m‟est nuict, voire 
eternelle?‟ More generally, like all Petrarchist ladies, Scève‟s lady has 
attributes not only of the cosmic but also of the divine; furthermore, 
arguably more so than in other contemporary French love lyricists, Biblical 
and theological language is used to refer to her and to the lover‟s 
relationship with her.
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 It is thanks to this divinised lady that oppositions are 
undermined or rendered complex and paradoxical. 
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 On Biblical language in the Délie, and its connections to evangelist discourse, see Kathryn Banks, „The 
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Graff, „Nombres et Emblèmes dans la “Délie”‟, Réforme, Humanisme, Renaissance: Bulletin de 
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chrétienne (Geneva: Droz, 1992); Defaux, „La Myrrhe, l‟aloès et la manne: pour une lecture mariale de 
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In the Ars – which belongs of course to a discourse very different 
from that of love lyric – the coincidence of opposites is not linked in any 
way to the erotic; however, it does point towards the divine. In the thought 
of Nicholas of Cusa – an important influence upon Bovelles – some sort of 
knowledge of God can be achieved through a vision of the coincidence of 
opposites.
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 In early sixteenth-century France, God is again described in 
ways which break down opposites, and the apparent paradoxes of such 
mystical language are particularly strikingly manifested in the writing of 
Guillaume Briçonnet, to whom the dedicatory letter of Bovelles‟s De 
                                                                                                                                                 
Délie‟, in Première poésie française de la Renaissance: autour des puys poétiques normands. Actes du 
colloque de Rouen, 30 Septembre – 2 Octobre 1999, ed. by Jean-Claude Arnould and Thierry Mantovani 
(Paris: Champion, 2003), pp. 243-61; id., „De Marie à Délie: le cèdre, le venin, la licorne et la colonne du 
Dieu vivant‟, in Ronsard, figure de la variété: en mémoire d’Isidore Silver, ed. by Colette Winn (Geneva: 
Droz, 2002), pp. 27-51; id., „(Re)visiting Délie: Maurice Scève and Marian poetry‟, Renaissance Quarterly, 
54.3 (2001), pp. 685-739; id., „Du nouveau sur Délie: Maurice Scève et la poésie mariale‟, A French 
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 See Maurice de Gandillac, „Lefèvre d‟Étaples et Charles de Bouelles, lecteurs de Nicolas de Cues‟, in 
L’Humanisme français au début de la Renaissance: Colloque international de Tours (XIVe stage) (Paris: J. 
Vrin, 1973), pp. 155-71 (165-6). 
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Sapiente is addressed.
23
 Bovelles‟s statement that „light is dark darkness‟ 
recalls such writing, and appears to represent one of the expressions of 
„divine mystery‟ alluded to in the dedicatory letter of the Ars (p. 34). 
Certainly, in the final lines of the Ars Oppositorum, the coincidence of 
opposites is considered to be a work of God.
24
 Furthermore, in Bovelles‟s 
Divinae caliginis liber (Book of Divine Darkness) of 1526 – which is deeply 
indebted to Pseudo-Denys – the coincidence of these opposites of light and 
darkness is clearly situated in the divine. 
One might argue then, that in both the Ars and the Délie complex 
articulations of difference are motivated at least in part by the desire to 
express the divine; unfortunately considerations of space prevent me from 
investigating this further here. Another focus for further study is that both 
texts explore opposition‟s relationship not only with the divine but also with 
the human: both express a deep interest in the relationship between 
difference and the human subject, and in the respective roles of nature and 
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human cognition in establishing differences. I would argue that, for both 
writers, causality and cognition seem to overlap in function, as if human 
attempts to establish difference might actually alter the world; yet, in the 
Délie the ie suffers intensely from difference, whereas, in the Ars, the human 
subject is privileged above the natural world in his relationship with 
difference. I will discuss these issues in a future essay but, as far as this one 
is concerned, I have aimed to demonstrate that the Délie and the Ars share an 
interest in undermining antithetical difference, in confusing it with other 
modes of difference, and ultimately in challenging the way we conceive of 
differences and identities.   
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